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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J O H N L E A C H , \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
"
vs
" I Case No. 
NORMA B. A N D E R S O N and ( i 3 8 0 8 
V A L L E Y BANK A N D T R U S T I 
COMPANY, j 
Defendants and Appellants. J 
A P P E L L A N T S ' B R I E F 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This action was brought by the respondent-credi-
tor against appellant-debtor and appellant-trustee 
seeking to invalidate a trust agreement to satisfy a 
judgment. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Although the lower court found that no fraud was 
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involved. I t invalidated the trust agreement based on a 
Utah statute and gave a judgment against appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment entered 
in lower court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
This case arises out of the efforts of the plaintiff 
to collect on a judgment against the defendant, Norma 
Anderson, from assets which were placed in trust with 
defendant, Valley Bank and Trust Company. The 
trust was created prior to the date of judgment and 
prior to the transaction on which the judgment is based. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trust is void under Utah sta-
tutes prohibiting conveyance of personal property in 
trust to defeat the claims of creditors. 
The facts center upon the execution of a promissory 
note, which is Exhibit 1-P [R-140], by the Angi Cor-
poration and payable to the plaintiff. The note was 
signed by David B. Anderson, who is the son of de-
fendant, Norma B. Anderson. Norma B. Anderson 
also signed as guarantor. Angi Corporation defaulted 
and the plaintiff obtained judgment against Norma B. 
Anderson. 
The promissory note was dated April 15, 1969. 
Five months prior to that date, on November 12, 1968, 
Norma B. Anderson created a trust with defendant, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company. Mrs. Anderson's 
purposes in creating the trust were twofold: 
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1. Mrs. Anderson is unable to resist the de-
mands of her son, who had a drinking problem, 
and who caused her to invest in his improvi-
dent business ventures [R-158 and Findings 
of Fact No. 2]. 
2. Mrs. Atnderson desired to protect her 
other children and her estate and required pro-
fessional management because of her improvi-
dence and inexperience. 
The Bank officer who counselled her in the preparation 
of the trust and in many meetings prior thereto cor-
roborated these reasons [R-180-85 et seq]. 
Plaintiff was unable to satisfy his judgment 
against Norma B. Anderson's personal assets and he 
brought this action to recover against the assets of the 
trust. 
The complaint is in two causes of action. The first 
cause of action was based on the theory that defendant, 
Norma B. Anderson, defrauded the plaintiff in relation 
to the presentation of the July 1968 financial state-
ment. Count I was dismissed by the court at the time 
of trial as being without support in the evidence. The 
court found that Mrs. Anderson had not given the 
financial statement to the plaintiff and that it was taken 
from her files without her knowledge. The promissory 
note was dated April 15, 1969, approximately one year 
after the date of the financial statement [July, 1968] 
and the plaintiff made no effort to verify the facts con-
tained in the statement to determine the accuracy there-
of or to run any credit checks of any kind [R-148-151]. 
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Count I I is based upon the theory that the trust 
is void as to the plaintiff under Section 25-1-11, Utah 
Code Annotated, which declares void trusts of personal 
property for the use of the trustor. 
Rex Guymon, trust officer of the defendant Valley 
Bank and Trust Company testified concerning the 
trust, its assets, and payments from the trust. Mr. Guy-
mon identified certain payments which had been made 
to Norma B. Anderson averaging $928.54 per year 
[R-1F6]. Mr. Guymon established that the payments 
referred to were insignificant in proportion to the trust 
assets and that on occassions Mrs. Anderson had re-
quested other payments which had been refused [R-
182]. The only payment of any consequence - the 
$5,000 paid to protect her interest in the Chuck Wagon 
property — was in reality a payment made to conserve 
the trust assets since the Chuck Wagon stock was also 
conveyed to and became a part of the trust estate [R-
1F6]. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E S T A T U T E D O E S NOT VOID 
T R U S T S I N W H I C H T H E TRUSTOR 
I S M E R E L Y AN I N C I D E N T A L BEN-
E F I C I A R Y 
Resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires careful 
application of all of the terms employed by the statute. 
The plaintiff cannot select those words which suit his 
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purpose and ignore other words which would preclude 
his claim. Plainly the statute must be construed in siich 
a way that each word is given its intended meaning, and 
if that meaning is applied plaintiff's claim miist fail. 
A. The statute applies only to trusts of personal 
property. 
By its own terms the statute applies onlj to "goods, 
chattels, or things in action made in trust." An exami-
nation of the trust instrument, which is in evidence, and 
the financial statement which the plaintiff claims misled 
him, will reveal that, in the main, this trust is composed 
of real property as to which the statute has no applica-
tion whatsoever. The Utah Supreme Court has so held 
in Geary v. Came, 71 Utah 268, 9 P . 2d 396, wherein 
the court stated: 
"She says that the conveyance. . . in which 
he conveyed all of his property in this state to 
the corporation, . . . without consideration, 
comes squarely within the provisions of said 
section. But such position cannot be main-
tained. Section 5816 relates only to transfers 
of personal property, not real property, and 
hence has no application to the conveyance of 
the real estate here involved. I t relates only to 
'goods, chattels, or things in action', which in 
any sense of the terms are not real property." 
Fhe financial statement [Exhibit 2] clearly shows 
that almost all of the assets of any real or substantial 
nature that were transferred to this trust are real estate 
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or interests in real estate. Therefore, in order to sustain 
the District Court's decision, this Court will have to 
directly overrule the case law in the State of Utah, 
which represents the majority opinion in the United 
States. 
B. The purposes of Norma B. Anderson's trust 
are not within the statute. 
Even if the trust assets were of the type contem-
plated by the statute, the statute declares that its pro-
visions apply only to trusts "for the use of the person 
making the same." The meaning of that phrase has never 
been defined by the Utah Supreme Court and in that 
sense this case is one of first impression. This Court 
must therefore look to the general law on the subject 
and the purposes of the statute itself. 
As already noted, the statute is directed to the con-
veyances of personal property in such a way as to shield 
them from "existing or subsequent creditors of such 
person." I t is, in simple terms, a statute directed at 
conveyances to defraud one's creditors. There is no evi-
dence in this case that Mrs. Anderson had any such 
purpose in mind or, that, viewed from the time of its 
creation this trust would defraud creditors. In fact, the 
only testimony on the subject is Norma Anderson's 
statement that at the time of the conveyance she de-
sired to protect herself from her son's improvidence, 
protect the interests of her other children and obtain 
good management of the assets. Mrs. Anderson further 
testified that she had retained in her own possession 
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ample assets which she believed would satisfy all of her 
known creditors as her claims matured: 
t lQ. Would you explain for the Court 
the resons why you caused that trust instru-
ment to be prepared and executed? 
A. Well, I didn't seem to be able to re-
fuse my son and he was wanting to open up so 
many Chuck Wagons and I really didn't want 
to get involved in them and I told him so but 
he just kept after me and kept after me to get 
money for this and money for that, to get into 
more and more Chuck Wagons and so, of 
course, my attorney wanted me to set up a 
trust so that I could refuse him so that, you 
know, I wouldn't - I couldn't go ahead and 
hand the money over to him which I was doing 
so that I could protect me and my children." 
[R-158] 
The testimony of Rex Guymon, the bank officer, 
corroborated Mrs. Anderson's testimony and these facts 
were never disputed: 
"Q. (By Mr. Biele) Thank you. Would 
you please state what she stated to you? 
A. She said that her husband was killed 
in an accident in 1967 and that she had consid-
erable problems as far as managing her affairs 
and needed administrative help from the bank 
and indicated that one of the main reasons that 
she wanted to set the trust up is to protect her-
self against an alcoholic son that was — that 
was continually asking her for money and she 
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could not refuse those requests and so the trust 
consequently was set up under the advice of 
her attorney after — 
Q. Were there any statements made to 
equalization of inheritance ? 
A. Yes. That was another reason why 
the trust was set up is because she had other 
children and other heirs to her estate and the 
way it was going her son, David, was receiving 
a share that was not -- would not be equal to 
the others and by putting it in an irrevocable 
trust this would insure her that the other child-
ren would get their proportionate share." [R. 
IF-4-5] 
The true purpose of this trust, as is evident by its 
provisions [R-8F-98] (which are their own best evi-
dence), is to conserve Mrs. Anderson's estate for the 
benefit of her children and grandchildren. This is evi-
dent from a reading of clauses IV and V of the trust, 
which contain three pages of detailed directions con-
cerning the distribution of trust assets to Mrs. Ander-
son's heirs. There are also provisions for the maintenance 
of Mrs. Anderson during her life, but these are common 
provisions in such an estate planning instrument and 
could not be held to render the trust one "for the use" 
of Mrs. Anderson, within the meaning of the statute. 
C. As a matter of law the statute does not apply. 
What is more fundamental, however, is that the 
purpose of this trust was not "for the use" of the trustor 
within the meaning of that term in law. 
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To adopt the plaintiff's construction of the statute 
would mean that the settlor of a trust could never have 
any beneficial interest, even as an incidental beneficiary, 
or the entire trust instrument would fail. Not only is 
that an unfair and unreasonable construction of a sta-
tute, the obvious purpose of which is to prevent fraud 
of creditors, but neither is the construction that has been 
placed on similar statutes in other jurisdictions. 
Thus Restatement of Trusts, 2d § 114 declares that 
the purpose of such statutes is to invalidate trusts which 
are for the sole benefit of the trustor: 
"§ll4. The Settlor as Beneficiary 
The Settlor of a trust may be one of the bene-
ficiaries or the sole beneficiary of the trust 
Illustrations 
1. Statutes. In some states there are statutes 
which provide that a transfer in trust for the 
benefit of the settlor is void. Such statutes are 
interpreted as sole benefit of the Settlor." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Such a construction is a sound one. Under any 
other construction the careless slip of a draftsman's 
pen (in which even a hypothetical interest of the settlor 
was retained) would have the effect of invalidating the 
entire trust. If this court were to adopt such a harsh 
reading of the statute it would, in truth, invalidate the 
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entire law of trusts. The extensive provisions of Utah 
law relating to the creation and interpretation of trusts, 
to which citations are necessary, attest that no such in-
tention may be ascribed to the legislature. 
P O I N T I I 
E V E N I F T H E COURT W E R E TO 
D E T E R M I N E T H A T A P P E L L A N T ' S 
T R U S T IS S U S C E P T I B L E TO T H E 
CLAIMS, T H E R E S P O N D E N T CAN 
O N L Y R E A C H T H A T A M O U N T 
T H A T T H E T R U S T E E U N D E R T H E 
T E R M S O F T H E T R U S T COULD P A Y 
TO T H E A P P E L L A N T OR A P P L Y 
F O R H E R B E N E F I T . 
While the meaning and construction to be given 
the statement in UCA 25-1-11 are not entirely clear, 
the underlying ^policy is evident. Generally speaking, 
it is against public policy to allow a person to create 
for his own benefit an interest in property that cannot 
be reached by his creditors. On the other hand, it is 
equally evident that public policy would not permit 
one's creditors to reach property in which the debtor 
has no beneficial interest and is unable to use and enjoy. 
Restatements of Trust 2d §156 states the general 
rule: 
"§156. Where the Settlor is a Beneficiary. 
(2) Where a person creates for his own 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
benefit a trust for support or a discretionary 
trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the 
maximum amount which the trustee under the 
terms of the trust could pay to him or apply 
for his benefit." 
The Anderson trust is a combination support and 
discretionary trust. Under the terms of the trust, the 
trustee " shall pay to or for the benefit of the grantor 
such portions of the income and principal of this trust 
as may be necessary to maintain the grantor in a reason-
able standard of living after taking into consideration 
other income received by Grantor". I t is within the trus-
tee's discretion to make payments "as may be necessary". 
The Trustee's discretion is not absolute, however, Para-
graph I I of the trust agreement goes on to provide a 
guideline for the trustee in determining what is a reason-
able standard of living. "In determining the standard 
of living to be maintained, the trustee shall use as a rule 
of guide the standard of living of the g<*rantor of the 
date of the execution of this agreement..." 
Applying the rule of §156(2) of the Restatement 
the maximum trust assets respondent would be able 
to reach would be the difference between the grantor's 
income from other sources and the amount necessary to 
maintain a standard of living comparable to that which 
she enjoyed in November of 1968. Pursuant to the 
statute, Respondent would only be able to reach "goods, 
chattels, or things in action," in order to satisfy his claim. 
Case law reinforces this portion. DiMaria v. Bank 
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of California National Association, 23 Cal. App. 2d 
254, 46 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1965) involved a situation simi-
lar to the instant case. In each case a widow with grown 
children has executed an irrevocable trust agreement 
transferring most of her assets to a bank. In each case 
the purpose of the trust was to free the trustor from 
the constant demands of her children. Each trust pro-
vided for certain distribution of the income to the trustor 
during her lifetime and the remainder to be distributed 
on her death to her children. Each provided that the 
trustee could apply for the trustor's benefit so much 
of the principal as the trustee deemed advisable if the 
income from other sources, should be insufficient to 
provide for the trustor's reasonable support. In the 
DiMaria case, the trustee's discretion is absolute, while 
as has been seen in the Anderson trust, the trustee's 
discretion is limited by certain guidelines. 
In a creditors suit to declare that the corpus of the 
trust was subject to his claim, the court held the trustee 
was justified in refusing to pay the creditor's claim from 
the corpus of the trust in the absence of a showing under 
the terms of the trust agreement that the settlor's in-
come from the trust and other sources was not sufficient 
for her reasonable support to authorize the exercise of 
trustee's discretion in invading the corpus for the settlor's 
benefit. 
The court reasoned that to permit recovery from the 
corpus without showing an inadequacy of the trustor's 
income from other sources for her support would give 
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the creditor access to trust assets not reachable by the 
beneficiary nor payable to her within the sound discre-
tion of the trustor. At 926: 
"The general rule is that the creditor of a 
beneficiary under a trust has no more rights 
and can secure no greater benefits from a trust 
than the beneficiary himself." 
The DiMaria court distinguished Ware v. Gulda, 
331 Mars 68, H7 N E 2d 137 (1954), and Greenwich 
Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211; 27A 2d 166 (1942); 
on the grounds that they dealt with discretionary trusts 
in which the income and/or principal was payable to 
the settlor/beneficiary subject only to the absolute dis-
cretion of the trustee. The court pointed out that the 
trustee's discretion over the payment of corpus is limited 
rather than absoulte. "The corpus can be invaded only 
if the income therefrom, together with Mrs. Walton's 
income from other sources, is insufficient to provide 
reasonable support, medical care and comfort. The dis-
cretion granted the trustee would clearly be abused by 
any arbitrary withdrawal not justified under this pro-
scription." At 926. 
This holding should be applied to the facts of this 
case. If the Anderson trust is found to be subject to 
the respondent claims, the respondent may not receive 
greater benefits than Mrs. Anderson herself. Therefore, 
the Respondent would only be able to reach the amount 
of personal property equal to that amount necessary 
to maintain the standard of living which she was ac-
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customed to in November 1968 minus the income Mrs. 
Anderson receives from outside sources. I t is up to the 
court to ascertain the amount of trust assets subject 
to the respondents claim. Scott on Trusts §156. 1 p. 
1197. 
The Respondent may argue that the DiMaria case 
is distinguishable from the present case in that the Wal-
ton trust did not contain a spendthrift provision and 
California has not enacted a statute comparable to UCA 
25-1-11. The fact that the Anderson trust contains a 
spendthrift provision should not affect an application 
of the holding in Dimaria to the facts of this case. Even 
if the spendthrift clause is held to be illegal as against 
the creditors of Mrs. Anderson, it has been held that 
this does not affect the validity of the other provisions 
of the trust. Liberty National Bank v. Hicks; 173 F2d 
631 (1948), 9ACR 2d 1335. 
The fact that there was no California statute simi-
lar to the Utah statute is not fatal to this case. UCA 
25-1-11 deals with trusts "for the use of the maker." If 
it is held that this statute is applicable to the trust in 
question it may only be so as to the portions of the trust 
that are "for the use of the maker". Any other reading 
of the statute would serve to give the creditors of Mrs. 
Anderson greater rights and benefits in the trust prop-
erty than she has for herself. This is contrary to the 
public policy underlying these statutes, Scott on Trust, 
§156 p. 1192-93. 
This is especially so considering that the domi-
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nating purpose behind the Anderson trust was not to 
avoid Mrs. Anderson's just obligations but rather to 
free herself from the constant demands of her son, 
David, and guarantee her other children a fair share 
of the estate she and her husband had developed over 
the years. 
Since the Court has personal jurisdiction of Mrs. 
Anderson, it could order her, under pain of contempt 
and possible imprisonment, to pay any sums paid to her 
by the trustee to the creditor, and the court need not 
upset or modify the provisions of the trust agreement 
or change the law of many years standing. 
P O I N T I I I 
S INCE T H E G I F T W A S A B S O L U T E 
A N D T H E T R U S T I R R E V O C A B L E , 
I T V E S T E D I N T E R E S T S IN C H I L -
D R E N A N D G R A N D C H I L D R E N A N D 
T H E S U S T A I N I N G OF T H E D I S -
T R I C T COURT W O U L D D I V E S T 
T H E S E P A R T I E S O F A V A L U A B L E 
R I G H T W I T H O U T H E A R I N G . 
Under the terms of the trust the proceeds are to 
be distributed to the children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren of Mrs. Anderson in accordance with 
fixed and described formulas. The trust was irrevocable. 
Mrs. Anderson retained no right to invade the trust 
principal. 
The trust creates a "grandchildren's trust" which 
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is for the benefit of "all of the grandchildren of the 
grantor, including such grandchildren as may be born 
after the date of the establishment of the trust and until 
final distribution of the trust portion" which occurs ten 
(10) years after the last grandchild living at the date 
of the establishment of the trust has attained the age of 
twenty-two (22) years. 
The grandchildren's trust provides for payments 
for health, hospital, medical, dental expenses, for religi-
ous education, college or technical education. These in-
terests are vested! The parties owning said interests 
are not represented in this case. Is it the policy of the 
court to take from yet unborn children or from parties 
not represented before the court their vested interests? 
Since this trust is for the benefit of many persons 
other than Mrs. Anderson and would continue for many 
years, it is obvious that the spendthrift provisions of 
the trust, as they apply to children and to grandchildren, 
are perfectly enforceable and realistic. 
On the other hand, if any amount or benefit, as a 
matter of right is payable to Mrs. Anderson, then such 
amount, when payable, could be subject to the claims 
of a creditor of Mrs. Anderson as the law prohibits 
enforcement of a spendthrift provision in relation to the 
person creating the trust. In this case, Mrs. Anderson 
had no right to demand any funds. The method and 
amount of payment is completely discretionary with 
the trustee who can pay the same for her benefit or to 
her as it, in its sole discretion, determines. 
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P O I N T IV 
T H E P L A I N T I F F S CLAIM IS BAR-
R E D BY T H E S T A T U T E OF L I M I T A -
TIONS. 
This trust was created on November 12, 1968. The 
promissory note that gave rise to the action in this case 
was dated April 15, 1969. The plaintiff's action to set 
aside the trust was filed March 27, 1972, which is more 
than three (3) years after the date of the creation of 
the trust. 
The applicable statute of limitations is 78-12-26: 
"(4) An action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state, other than for a pen-
alty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, 
except where in special cases a different limi-
tation is prescribed by the statutes of this 
state." 
Since the plaintiff's claim for relief in this action is 
based on the Utah statute (25-1-11 UCA) and since 
there is no tolling provision of the statute, this cause 
of action by the plaintiff is barred. I t is interesting to 
note that in the prior two subsections (2) (3), the legis-
lature has deemed it provident to include tolling pro-
visions that defer the running of the statute until a 
party obtains knowledge of the claimed violation of the 
statute. There is no tolling provision in subsection (4)! 
The primary assets of the trust in this case consist 
of real estate which was immediately transferred to the 
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trustee thereby, under Utah statutes, giving constructive 
notice of the transfer. Any check of the records or re-
view of the financial condition of the applicant would 
disclose transfers to the trust. In this case the court 
found, as a matter of fact, that there was no fraudulent 
intent by Mrs. Anderson. 
The case of Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 
P.2d 264, is on all fours with the case at hand, for, in 
that case, as in this case, the court held that there was 
no fraud shown and that the statute of limitations runs 
from the time of recording of the conveyances, as all 
persons are given notice by the recording. The court 
stated: 
"[12] . . . . From the time of recording 
these conveyances all persons, including plain-
tiffs, notice was imparted to them that the con-
veyances contained the statements above 
quoted. . . . " ••••** * • 
"[20,21] We are of the opinion that the 
action is barred under the statutes of limita-
tions for the reason that discovery was made, 
or the situation was such as to furnish full 
opportunity for the discovery of fraud, if any 
existed, more than three years before the bring-
ing of the action. We are further of the opinion 
there was no fraud shown. . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Since the Smith v. Edwards case is identical with 
the case at hand, it is obvious that the same judgment 
should apply and the Supreme Court should sustain its 
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prior order by determining that the statute of limita-
tions has run and the action is barred. 
P O I N T V 
U N L E S S T H E S E T T L O R H A S T H E 
" U S E " OR CONTROL OF T H E P R I N -
CIPAL, S U B S E Q U E N T C R E D I T O R S 
H A V E NO R I G H T TO S E T A S I D E 
T H E T R U S T OR T H E CONVEY-
A N C E S TO T H E TRUST. 
The Utah statute (25-1-11) states: 
". . . All conveyances . . . made in trust for the 
use of the person making the same shall be 
void . . ." 
In the present case the trust is only incidentally or 
partially for the use of the grantor and primarily for 
the fmmmtmxx 01 the estate and with instant vesting m 
the beneficiaries of the trust. 
The general rule in cases similar to the instant case 
is stated in Stirlin v. Teschemacher, Missouri 64 SW 
2d 647, 91 A L R 121: 
". . . The general rule is that a subsequent 
creditor will not be heard to complain about 
what his debtor did with his property before 
the accural of the indebtedness..." 
This general proposition is affirmed in 37 Am Jur 
2d, Sec. 28: 
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". . . In order that the transfer may be sus-
tained as to subsequent creditors, it must 
appear that the settlor has divested himself of 
all rights of ownership in and control over the 
property conveyed, reserving only to himself 
the right to receive the income during life. . ." 
"A statute providing that every conveyance 
in trust to the use of the transferor shall be 
void as against creditors does not invalidate 
a conveyance of a remainder interest . . . 
created in behalf of another." 
Since the Court in this case has held that the trust 
was created without any fraudulent intent, then the 
almost universal rule is set forth in 93 A L R 1205-1212 
wherein the cases hold that such a trust is valid against 
subsequent creditors. The case of Merchantile Trust 
Company v. Bergdorf and G. Cole 93 A L R 1205, 167 
Md 158, 173 Atlantic 31 held that where a trust was 
created without fradulent intent and with the net in-
come payable to the settlor for life, cannot be subject 
to the payment of the settlor's debts subsequently. In 
93 A L R at page 1212 editors state : 
" I t would seem that such a conveyance is not 
invalid as to subsequent creditors if the remain-
der intef&st is not retained in the settlor but 
*&<ra.iy a powe^pf^ppointment..." 
In the instant case the grantor has not even reserved 
the right of a power of appointment but has actually 
and definitively vested all of the remainders. The editors 
further states at page 12l3: 
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". . . actual fraud of the settlor is generally 
essential to the success of subsequent creditors 
. . . citing many cases." 
CONCLUSION 
The settlor in this case, Norma B. Anderson, with-
out any intent to defraud creditors but rather to provide 
against her own improvidence and protect the rights 
of her children and grandchildren in the estate that 
had been created by her deceased husband, created a 
trust. Mrs. Anderson reserved no right in herself or 
control over the trust corpus. Further, Mrs. Anderson 
is not even entitled to all of the income of the trust but 
only to those funds necessary to maintain her standard 
of living after taking into consideration other sources 
of income. This trust is not solely for the use of the 
grantor. I t is not created to defraud creditors. I t was 
established so that Mrs. Anderson, during her lifetime, 
would not become a dependent on society and her child-
ren would have a share in their father's estate. Mrs. 
Anderson made no representations to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff made no effort to check the validity of any 
representations or even to contact Mrs. Anderson and 
yet he now seeks to take from her and her children and 
grandchildren the security of this trust. ^ttMkfc* 
i « H ^ i a i * N p m J N M W ^ ^ If the 
court is to sustain the plaintiff in this case, it would make 
it impossible for a person who is informed that he has 
rapidly advancing "early senility" or "acute alcoholism" 
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or other physical or emotional problem to place his assets 
in such a condition that they would provide for him and 
against the problems arising from his disease. Obviously, 
it is not in the public interest to set aside this trust. 
The implications of such a decision would cause a com-
plete revolution in trust business and in the ability of a 
free man to provide for himself and against the infirm-
ities of time and disease. 
Further, the plaintiff has slept on his rights and 
the period of limitations allowed for the commencement 
of any action has expired. This court must overrule 
prior decisions in order to sustain this late filed action. 
In addition, primary assets of this trust consist of 
real estate and this court has held that the statute does 
not apply to transfers of real estate in trust. To sustain 
the plaintiff's cause in this case it must again overrule 
a prior, well-founded decision which would have many 
very serious implications, such as the affect on the Trust 
Deed Act of the State of Utah, the affect on transfers 
reserving life estates, etc. 
The trust that44s subject to this action is only inci-
dentally ajid partially; for the benefit of the trustor, and 
the purposes of this trust are not within those prohibited 
by the statute. This court has been consistent in follow-
ing the recommendations as contained in the Restate-
ment of Trusts and the Restatement recommendation 
in this case is that "such statutes are interpreted as ap-
plicable only where the intended trust is for the sole 
benefit of the settlor". 
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This trust is not for the sole purpose of the settlor, 
the statute of limitations has expired and the settlor, 
the widow Mrs. Anderson, would be penalized for her 
providence if the Supreme Court were to sustain the 
action of the District Court. Therefore, your appellants 
respectfully move the Court for its order reversing the 
decision of the District Court in determining that the 
Utah statute, Section 25-1-11 is not applicable to the 
trust created under the circumstances in this case. 
D A T E D this 3rd day of January, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By IfiUb % \uJ^^ 
P A R K E R M. N I E L S O N 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Norma B. Anderson 
L^& 
I R W t f G H. B I E L E of 
B I E L E , H A S L A M & H A T C H 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company 
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